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The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Manipulation
Eric A. Posner 1
June 10, 2015

Abstract. This comment on Cass Sunstein’s paper, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, argues
that “manipulation”— “controlling or playing upon someone by artful, unfair, or
insidious means especially to one’s own advantage”—has always been regarded as
wrongful, an indirect form of fraud, by common law courts and government regulators.
The manipulator perceives that the victim brings incorrect assumptions to a transaction
and does not correct them, or else anticipates and takes advantage of people’s propensity
to make incorrect inferences. Thus, the manipulator is able to effect a transfer from the
victim to himself without resorting to explicit fraudulent statements or coercion. Within
the various standard constraints like problems of proof, the government should and does
try to restrict manipulation for standard efficiency and welfarist reasons. The law does
not provide a remedy to fraud when it causes no harm, and similarly it should not for
manipulation. Analogously, I argue that when government uses manipulation to advance
the public good, it should be evaluated on welfarist grounds.

Is manipulation a problem? Should the law try to stop it? Should the government employ
manipulation if the government’s ends are good ones? As is so often the case, the answers
depend on how one defines the term. In this comment, I argue that manipulation (properly
understood) where it takes place in the marketplace is a problem and for that reason is regulated
by the law. Manipulation by the government, by contrast, is not a special or specially
troublesome category of government behavior, and is justified just when government coercion is.
A few judicial opinions will be used to illustrate the problem of manipulation, and provide a
springboard for answers to the questions I began with.
I start with a definition of manipulation taken from the dictionary: “to control or play
upon by artful, unfair, or insidious means especially to one’s own advantage.” 2 The definition
usefully distinguishes between means and ends. The means may be objectionable (“unfair,”
“insidious”) but they need not be; they could merely be clever (“artful”). As will become clear, I
define manipulation in a relatively narrow way: the manipulator perceives that his addressee
brings to incorrect assumptions to a transaction and does not correct them, or else anticipates and
takes advantage of people’s propensity to make incorrect inferences. Whether this behavior is
unfair or merely artful depends, I will argue, on what the manipulator is trying to accomplish.
For brevity, I will often refer to the means element of manipulation as insincerity. At a
minimum, the manipulator does not fully explain to the addressee what he is doing.
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The end of manipulation, according to our definition, is typically one’s own advantage,
but it need not be. Parents frequently manipulate their children for the children’s interest, and not
for (or not just for) the parents’. A common parental trick is to walk away from a stubborn
toddler, telling her that she will be left behind if she does not proceed on her own locomotion.
This manipulation benefits the child if otherwise the parent injures his back carrying the child
and drops her headfirst to the ground, or they miss dinner, bedtime, etc., because of the child’s
reluctance to move along.
The matrix below illustrates these comments and provide a hint as to why libertarian
paternalism is controversial.

Means
Sincere
Insincere

Ends
Jointly beneficial (or benefits
Transfer (benefits speaker at
addressee)
expense of addressee)
Good
N/A
Paternalism
Exploitation

The northwest box contains the ideal case, where a speaker plainly explains why the addressee
should do X or Y and the addressee responds in kind. A lawyer advises the client that he can’t
win the case and the client drops it. The government explains that cigarette smoking harms your
health and you stop smoking. A parent explains to the child that it is dangerous to cross the street
without looking and the child looks. I stipulate that if the speaker is sincere, the addressee will
always act in his own interest (northeast box is therefore empty), although of course people can
make mistakes.
The southeast box contains the paradigm case of manipulation where the speaker causes
the addressee to act to the speaker’s advantage, at the expense of the addressee. The seller,
marketer, propagandist, etc., conveys the state of the world in a misleading way, causing the
addressee to buy or support something he doesn’t want. The southwest box represents
paternalism, both private and public. The parent tricks the toddler, and the government tricks the
citizen—but in both cases to the addressee’s advantage.
In this comment, I will flesh out the concept of manipulation by focusing on the private
arena—where sellers manipulate buyers. While no law or legal doctrine by its terms bans such
behavior, numerous doctrines allow courts to restrict it when the levels of culpability and of
harm are sufficiently high. The rules against manipulation, so understood, can be given a simple
welfarist account based on standard principles of law and economics. Manipulation is a classic
type of rent-seeking behavior that results in a transfer of resources rather than in wealth
generation, while causing potential victims to take expensive precautions. This perspective
provides a way to think about the more complicated forms of manipulation that involve
advantage-taking of cognitive biases and heuristics.
Finally, I turn to the government. The genesis of Cass Sunstein’s paper lies in the
accusations lodged against him by critics of “libertarian paternalism,” the approach to policy that
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he advocates with Richard Thaler in Nudge and other work. 3 The critics argue that nudges, or at
least many of them, “pervert decision making.” 4 I agree with Sunstein that there is nothing
inherently objectionable about libertarian paternalism from the standpoint of “manipulation.”
Some of my comments, however, may be useful for evaluating certain policy interventions on a
case-by-case basis.
I. The Law of Manipulation
Sunstein is correct that manipulation has many shades of grey but I don’t think he’s right
that the legal system “usually does not attempt to prevent it” (p. 6). If one looks at the common
law rather than regulation, one finds many examples of lawsuits in which plaintiffs complain that
they were manipulated by defendants and courts lend a sympathetic ear. What is true is that
many types of manipulation cause little harm, and so people do not bother to bring lawsuits and
courts may rule against victims when they do because other values are at stake. But this is true
for all types of behavior. If you touch someone on his arm without his permission, that is legally
an assault, and the person you touch could sue you, but if he did and won, his damages would be
zero.
The problem of manipulation arises, predictably enough, in numerous cases where
businesses try to take advantage of consumers without engaging in outright fraud, which, under
the law, requires an explicit misstatement of fact. In a recurrent pattern, a seller offers a product
or service while omitting a feature or warranty that consumers normally assume will be part of
the deal. In the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 5 for example, the plaintiffs bought a
car from a dealership and were later injured in an accident caused by a defect. In the contract,
there was the following clause, in a small, hard-to-read font:
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including original equipment placed
thereon by the manufacturer except tires), chassis or parts manufactured by it to be free
from defects in material or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation
under this warranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof
which shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original
purchaser or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall first
occur, be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination
shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective; This warranty being
expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or
liabilities on its part, and it neither assumes nor authorizes any other person to assume for
it any other liability in connection with the sale of its vehicles. 6
The problem here is not just the perhaps unavoidable tedium of plowing through mind-numbing
legalese. The problem is that the seller uses legalistic language to conceal that the seller
disclaims what many buyers might assume that the seller provides—a promise that if a defect in
the car causes personal injuries, the seller will compensate the buyer for those injuries. The two
3
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underlined phrases limit the remedy without saying what is excluded, so even someone who
managed to wade through this stuff would not be alerted to what he is giving up.
Is this type of contract-writing manipulative? It seems to be. Drafting a contract so that
the buyer thinks that he receives protection that he does not receive—all without overtly lying—
is clearly manipulative. It is worth understanding why. The seller understands that many buyers
bring to a transaction certain assumptions. In Henningsen, the buyers assumed that the seller
would pay them damages for personal injuries if a defect in the car causes an accident. The seller
could dispel this misunderstanding, but chooses not to by drafting the contract in such a way that
most buyers will overlook the language that discloses that their assumption is incorrect.
Courts caught on to this practice long ago and today police these contracts like
watchdogs. It is not hard to find cases where the seller loses. The general problem—of language
that is manipulative but not fraudulent—is addressed in statutes as well. The Truth in Lending
Act, for example, requires lenders not only to tell the truth but to express the costs of loans in a
way that makes it easy (at least in theory) to compare the terms of one loan to the terms of
another. The Act recognizes that lenders like sellers can manipulate consumers by using
language that consumers do not understand and—crucially—that consumers do not realize they
do not understand, so they don’t think to ask for a clarification.
For a different kind of manipulation, consider Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District. 7
An elementary school teacher was arrested for engaging in homosexual conduct—a crime at the
time—and booked and then released. He subsequently agreed to resign at the request of his
employers, and then sued for the rescission of that agreement. He alleged that
he was under such severe mental and emotional strain at the time he signed his
resignation, having just completed the process of arrest, questioning by the police,
booking, and release on bail, and having gone for 40 hours without sleep, that he was
incapable of rational thought or action. While he was in this condition and unable to think
clearly, the superintendent of the district and the principal of his school came to his
apartment. They said they were trying to help him and had his best interests at heart, that
he should take their advice and immediately resign his position with the district, that
there was no time to consult an attorney, that if he did not resign immediately the district
would suspend and dismiss him from his position and publicize the proceedings, his
“aforedescribed arrest” and cause him “to suffer extreme embarrassment and
humiliation”; but that if he resigned at once the incident would not be publicized and
would not jeopardize his chances of securing employment as a teacher elsewhere. 8
The court held that the defendants had not coerced the teacher, and had not used fraud, but
nonetheless held in the teacher’s favor under the doctrine of “undue influence.” Here again we
can redescribe the defendants’ behavior as “manipulation.” They used artful, unfair, and
insidious means to their advantage, means that included confronting the teacher while he was
tired and emotionally distraught, drawing a vivid picture of the negative consequences if he did
not resign, and insisting that they sought only to act in his own interests.
7
8
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If the cases discussed so far suggest that the law tries to stop manipulation only when
used against consumers or vulnerable individuals, the impression is not correct. Consider a wellknown case taught in classrooms called Market Street Associates Limited Partnership v. Frey. 9
The dispute arose from a sale-leaseback between J.C. Penney and General Electric Pension
Trust. Penney borrowed money from the pension trust by selling various properties to it and
leasing them back—effectively paying interest rate on the loan in the form of rent. The lease
provided that if Penney needed additional financing, it could ask the pension trust for a loan, and
both parties would be required to negotiate an interest rate in good faith. If negotiations broke
down, then, under paragraph 34 of the lease, Penney would have the right to buy back the
properties at the original price subject to a 6-percent annual adjustment.
Penney later assigned the lease to Market Street Associates. MSA decided to try to buy
the properties back from the pension trust so that it could use them as security for additional
financing. An MSA partner named Orenstein contacted his counterpart at the pension trust—a
man named Erb—who offered to sell the properties at a price that Orenstein thought was too
high. A month later, MSA sent a letter to the pension trust requesting a $2 million loan. The
letter did not mention paragraph 34 or the lease itself. Erb did not respond. MSA sent another
letter which again asked for the loan and offering to enter negotiations. Meanwhile, Erb turned
down the loan. MSA then wrote a letter saying that it would seek a loan elsewhere. In none of
the letters sent by MSA was paragraph 34 mentioned. Then a month later, Orenstein wrote a
letter that invoked paragraph 34 and demanded the property at its original price subject to the 6percent adjustment—an amount significantly less than what Penney had offered. The pension
trust refused to sell, and the lawsuit followed.
Orenstein’s behavior, on the plaintiff’s account, is a straightforward example of
manipulation. Orenstein never lied to Erb—which would have been actionable fraud. His
strategy was more subtle than that. He assumed (correctly) that Erb would not consult the
lease—a lengthy, tedious document dense with legalese—before turning down a loan request
that did not meet the pension trust’s investment criteria because it was too small. Even while
exploiting the trigger in paragraph 34, Orenstein made sure not to draw Erb’s attention to it—
until it was too late. The court held that if MSA can prove that Orenstein believed that Erb did
not know or would not find out about paragraph 34, then the pension trust wins the case.
To be clear, the court did not hold that MSA violated a “law against manipulation.” It
held that if Orenstein acted in bad faith or opportunistically, then MSA breached the contract.
But the specific legal hooks are of no concern here. The court was bothered by manipulative
behavior. Orenstein should have reminded Erb of paragraph 34, especially because he knew that
Erb was inattentive. Failure to do so was, arguably, the use of “artful, unfair, or insidious means
… to one’s own advantage.”
There is a law against manipulation though it goes under various other names:
unconscionability, misunderstanding, 10 bad faith, deceit, and so on. Manipulation is a type of
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misbehavior that is not quite fraud and not quite coercion, but achieves the same goals that those
other types of behavior do. It frequently involves the exploitation of incorrect assumptions that
the manipulator knows that his victim brings to the transaction, so that the manipulator can take
advantage of those assumptions without overtly lying. It causes a person to act against his own
interest, and for the interest of someone else, in a setting where the victim cannot easily protect
himself by relying on common sense or ordinary willpower.
II. The Economics of Manipulation
The economics of manipulation has not, in these terms, ever been discussed or identified,
but probably because the economics of manipulation are the same as those of its cousins—fraud
and coercion—which have received a great deal of attention.
Consider the simple case of coercion. X forcibly takes money from Y. For what reason,
from an economic perspective, should Y be given a remedy? The conventional economic
wisdom is that, initially, a simple transfer of $100 from the pocket of Y to the pocket of X does
not generate any wealth. X and Y value the $100 at exactly the same amount—$100. 11 So
nothing is gained from this act from a social standpoint. Meanwhile, if the theft were
unpunished, then people would need to take expensive precautions to protect themselves. Y
might buy a gun or hire a bodyguard or not leave his house. The case for a law against theft,
then, rests on the simple premise that the government—using its laws and institutions—can deter
forcible transfers more cheaply than individuals acting on their own.
The case of fraud is similar. Some sellers try to defraud buyers by representing used cars
as new. They slap fresh paint on old cars and set the odometer back to zero. Buyers could protect
themselves from this fraud by bringing a mechanic along with them and insisting that they will
not buy a car until the mechanic has inspected it. Either buyers will incur the cost of
compensating a mechanic or end up with cars they don’t want. A legal remedy for fraud is
cheaper for society than conditions in which fraud or self-protective behavior flourishes.
The manipulation cases fall easily into this pattern. Sellers should inform buyers of the
terms of the contract so that buyer don’t need to hire lawyers to protect them from buying things
that they don’t want. Orenstein should have reminded Erb of paragraph 34 because Orenstein
knew (or so it was alleged) that Erb did not know about it, and could have reminded him of it
cheaply. Odorizzi’s employers should have let him have a night’s sleep and advised him to
consult a lawyer.
I want to make a last point about the difference between manipulation and simple lack of
clarity. The school principal and Orenstein both engaged in manipulation. They knew that the
actions they took would result in the transfer they sought. When firms design complex forms,
they may well engage in similar manipulation. But they don’t always. Many of the complex11
Complications arise when a poor person steals from a rich person. The poor person obtains more utility from $100
than the rich person does. Or one can imagine a case where an art lover steals a Gaugin from a tycoon who does not
appreciate it. In these cases, the transfers increase social welfare, but they will also generate huge self-protective
costs and are banned for that reason. In the second case, economists also argue that bargaining is a more efficient
form of transfer than coercion because bargaining ensures that the transfer increases joint utility.
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language cases are not cases of manipulation because no one sought to mislead. Poor drafting
can be a sufficient cause for the type of confusion that causes transfers victims don’t benefit
from.
To make clear this distinction, consider an employer that wants employees to buy stock
in the employer but does not want to be seen as forcing them to. Taking a page from behavioral
economics, it sets out its own stock as the default in employees’ 401(k) plan but allows the
employees to opt out. The employer knows that most employees will not opt out for
psychological reason. By contrast, imagine an employer that sets up two randomly selected stock
index funds and two randomly selected bond index funds as the default. Research in behavioral
economics tells us that many or most employees will contribute equally to the four funds, which
is not likely to be in their interest.
From a moral standpoint, the first employer is more culpable than the second. If
economic lingo must be used, the way to put this is that the second employer faced real costs if it
wanted to improve the allocation. It chose not to incur them—quite possibly because no one
really knows what an optimal default would look like. It may well be that a reasonable
expenditure to improve them in a meaningful way might not have been possible. By contrast, the
first employer could have at zero cost to itself refrained from making its own stock the default.
The first employer’s manipulation in this way resembles fraud. And just as in the case of
manipulation, a person who deliberately misrepresents the truth is considered more culpable than
someone who does so accidentally, and more likely to be slapped with a penalty. In MSA, the
court rested on just this principle when it held that the pension trust could prevail only if it
proved that Orenstein knowingly took advantage of Erb’s ignorance.
The economic approach to manipulation rests on a simplified, perhaps unhelpful, picture
of human rationality. In the case of the consumer who does not read the contract, we say his
information cost is high. In an economic model, Henningsen enters the transaction with a
subjective prior that the warranty will cover personal injuries. The prior is strong enough that
Henningsen does not think it is worth the cost to take the contract home, read it carefully, consult
a lawyer, and so on. This cost is greater than the expected harm from the probability of a defect
multiplied by the probability of an accident multiplied by the probability of an injury multiplied
by the probability that the warranty does not cover personal injury multiplied by the harm. By
contrast, the cost to the seller of disclosing this information to Henningsen is low. So the law
puts the burden on the seller to disclose rather than on the buyer to read.
I have simplified the economic analysis and ignored various objections. For example,
there has been a lively debate about whether sellers would voluntarily disclose information—like
the limited warranty—in order to obtain a competitive advantage. Some commentators argue that
if Bloomfield Motors refuses to offer a warranty while trying to mislead buyers into thinking that
it does, and consumers are willing to pay for warranties, then competitors should be willing to
offer warranties and trumpet Bloomfield Motors’ refusal to do so. Others argue that in markets
characterized by asymmetric information and market power, sellers can gain by concealing
information. Another issue concerns whether it is really as cheap for the seller to disclose
information as the analysis above suggests. Sellers do not always know the entire range of
product attributes that consumers care about, and so may be unable to predict what they need to
7

know. Finally, courts are rarely in position to stop manipulation unless it is obvious. But the
principle seems to be clear. Indeed, we could identify an anti-manipulation or (perhaps, more
properly) an anti-advantage-taking principle. According to this principle, a person may not effect
a transfer of resources by intentionally saying or doing things that causes the other person to
misunderstand the nature of the transaction, and think that the transaction is in his interest when
it’s not.

III. The Psychology of Manipulation
The economic analysis rests on a very simple model of human decisionmaking. The
cognitive biases discussed by Sunstein are not so much ignored as swept under the rug of
“information costs” or “transaction costs.” Scholars writing in this tradition, laboring under the
discipline of the rational-actor model, have generally overlooked the different ways that people
can take advantage of each other, and thus have missed opportunities for tailoring appropriate
legal responses that are sensitive to the psychological nuances involved. Still, the very simple
anti-manipulation principle that I have discussed provides an entry-point for thinking about this
problem.
Let’s consider two examples. In the first, health clubs exploit people’s excessive
optimism about their ability to commit to an exercise regimen (sometimes called “hyperbolic
discounting”). A club might offer the choice between a $10/day pass or a $500/year membership.
Customers believe that they will exercise at least three times a week and so choose the annual
membership because $500 is less than approximately $1560. In fact, most customers use the club
a handful of times and then stop. The club knows from experience that most people will not keep
their commitments. We might conclude that the club engages in a mild form of manipulation by
offering the $500/membership—especially if it encourages people to take it by describing in
glowing terms unrealistic scenarios of lost weight and toned muscles.
The example falls firmly within the anti-manipulation principle. The club effects a
transfer of money from customers to itself—a pure transfer which by definition does not increase
social welfare. If few people or no one benefits from the annual membership, the club could
easily avoid these unnecessary transfers by declining to offer it. The existence of this type of
manipulation contributes to an atmosphere of mistrust, which requires people to use their wiles
to avoid similar temptations—a cost, even if a hard-to-quantify cost.
From a legal standpoint, a simple lawsuit to obtain restitution of one’s money would
probably fail. I think the reason is that the annual membership benefits some people—those who
really do want to use the club several times a week for an entire year. If a court held that a health
club can’t offer annual memberships, then it would deprive those customers of something they
value. Moreover, virtually any menu of options will mislead some people, causing them to
choose an option that is not best for them. The inherent complexity of communication, combined
with the ubiquitous quirks of rationality, virtually guarantees this result. Courts should not—and
likely will not—interfere with private transactions by demanding clarity in communication that
cannot realistically be achieved.
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In the second, creditors offer “teaser rates” in order to induce people to borrow money, or
structure lending transactions in ways that people find confusing. These practices exploit
people’s excessive optimism—they think they will pay off loans when in fact they will not—and
their lack of sophistication about financial transactions. Many people do not understand basic
financial concepts like compound interest. They don’t realize that a fee on a small loan is
equivalent to an extremely high rate of interest that they would normally reject.
This example is more troublesome than the health club case because loan transactions are
both more important and more confusing for people than health club memberships. A person
who obtains a mortgage at a teaser rate might believe—unrealistically—that he can either
refinance or resell the house at a profit before the rate resets. If this belief is unrealistic, and the
seller both knows that the belief is unrealistic and structures the loan to take advantage of it, then
the transaction is manipulative. The creditor effects a transfer of money from the borrower to
itself. Again, the transfer does not enhance social wealth; indeed, it will reduce social wealth
when a costly foreclosure takes place. Again, we would be better off if the law halted these
transactions. Again, things aren’t simple because many people could genuinely benefit from
teaser rates—for example, people who expect a salary increase, bequest, or other windfall before
the rate resets.
Ironically, the law has always been far ahead of the academics. Efforts to address these
problems date back at least until the 1960s. Courts, regulators, and legislatures have banned
some credit terms that seemed inherently abusive—that creditors seemed to use routinely to
manipulate consumers. A famous example is the cross-collateral clause, which allowed creditors
to repossess goods that credit buyers had thought they had repaid in full. The clause was struck
down by courts and then banned by regulators. 12 Economists argued that these clauses could be
beneficial for some people—and, more aggressively, that they had to be beneficial because they
survived market competition. Policymakers wisely disregarded these arguments. Psychologists
have since provided plausible reasons for thinking that even if many of these clauses can be
beneficial, they can also be used to exploit cognitive biases, and may well do more harm in the
aggregate than good.
However, the point I want to make does not depend on whether these clauses are on
balance good or bad. The point is that sellers and creditors can use contractual design both to
generate a socially valuable transaction—one that benefits both sides—and to manipulate. In the
latter case, the contract effects a transfer from buyer to seller rather than a wealth-generating
transaction. Manipulation produces no social gain, while causing people to take costly selfprotective measures. It also typically harms poor and vulnerable people. This is why the law tries
to restrict it.
IV. Government Manipulation
With this framework in hand, we can finally turn to the topic of Sunstein’s paper—the
use of “manipulation” by the government. Now we have a transaction between a person and the
government. Under what circumstances does the transaction run afoul of the anti-manipulation
principle?
12
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In the simplest case, the government may use manipulation in precisely the way that
private parties do—to effect a transfer through artfulness or unfairness. The government engages
in numerous transactions with citizens. People read complex forms and documents when they
pay taxes, apply for drivers licenses, and start businesses. If the government wants an outcome
that many people would resist, it can try to use complex language, opt-outs, and similar devices
to obtain these outcomes through manipulation. It can do the same through regulation by
compelling private parties (usually sellers or employers) to use appropriate language and optouts in contracts.
Now it is not clear that government officials do this consciously, as one suspects that
market actors often do. Market agents face pressure to maximize profits, and if manipulation
maximizes profits, they will be tempted to manipulate. 13 Sometimes, clarity maximizes profits
and then they will be clear. So in the market, one can find both very clear and very complex
contracts. By contrast, government officials seem to churn out confusing but not intentionally
manipulative forms because they personally gain nothing from clarity and nothing from
manipulation.
Nonetheless, we can begin to understand the negative reaction to libertarian paternalism.
People have long called for the government to use clearer forms. For the most part, these calls
have gone nowhere. But the call for the government to exploit people’s cognitive biases is a new
one. This argument seems to ask government officials to think like marketers and advertisers—
all of them behavioral economists avant la lettre—people who we have never been inclined to
trust.
Sunstein provides two responses. The first is that nudging is no more manipulative than
other forms of communication. Indeed, one might argue that nudging just is a form of
communication. The second is that even if nudging is manipulative, it will generally be justified
so long as it advances the public’s interest.
Let me start with the first response. When we communicate with each other, we
inherently take account of behavioral biases—or at least, the psychology, in a broad sense, of the
listener. How could we not? We need to use metaphors, images, exaggerations, and so on, just to
convey meaning to people who may bring to bear strong assumptions, confusions, and so on. The
cafeteria example illustrates this point. People in the cafeteria line will act in one way if dessert
comes first and another way if dessert comes last. There is no non-manipulative way to arrange
the food. Similarly, there is no non-manipulative way to write a contract, choose between opt-ins
and opt-outs, and so on. Here “manipulation” is used in its innocent sense. The drafter knows
more than the customer or citizen, but cannot fully inform his counterpart because of the limits
of communication. He thus avoids informing to the extent that it be theoretically possible and
instead tries to offer a product or menu of choices that he thinks the counterpart would want.
While there is an element of truth in this argument, I don’t think it’s persuasive. It may be
that in some settings it is impossible to identify sincere, clear, or non-manipulative speech or
behavior. But in normal settings, that is not the case. We might throw up our hands in the
13
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cafeteria but still demand that automobile sellers explains the pros and cons of a particular model
of automobile rather than distract buyers with mood lighting, balloons, and free steak knives.
Moreover, if we focus on the mental state of the speaker, we can distinguish cases of
manipulation and non-manipulation. If the cafeteria owner puts dessert at the start of the line
because that’s what he has always done, or the dessert fits better in that location, or it seems
aesthetically pleasing, he’s not deliberately manipulating people. If he has read Sunstein and
Thaler and wants to make profits by selling food that people don’t really want, then he is
manipulating people. We want to discourage manipulative behavior because people who might
be tempted to manipulate can easily refrain from it if made aware of it. Communicative behavior
that is inadvertently confusing and produces unintended negative consequences is a less
avoidable feature of life. In the common law, this distinction has been made, as I have explained.
In sum, critics of libertarian paternalism can coherently take the position that inadvertent
exploitation of biases is less bad than intentional exploitation of biases. But, as the common law
analogy shows, intentional exploitation of biases is hard to object to unless the victim or
addressee is harmed.
For that reason, I find Sunstein’s second response more powerful. A government, unlike a
seller, should act in the interest of the public. If we can publicly debate the government’s actions
and approve or disapprove of them based on their consequences, then we should endorse those
that produce good consequences at a wholesale level even if they involve exploitation of
behavioral biases at the retail level. If it’s hard to communicate with people because of the noise
of everyday life, then the government should use effective rather than ineffective means to do so.
But he sells his argument short. I don’t find any of Sunstein’s “not easy” cases not easy.
If people do not understand an abstraction like 1/100,000 because of the way that their brains
work, then public officials should use a concrete formulation that they do understand. If a hazard
doubles a remote risk, the government may be better able to convey that information by telling
people that the risk is higher but still remote than by telling them only that the risk is higher. But
if people discount remote risks without understanding them, then telling them that the risk is
double without telling them that it is remote may better communicate the hazards to them.
Everything depends on the assumptions and cognitive quirks that people bring to bear on the
stream of information supplied by the government.
I think that what makes these examples seem at first sight not easy is not the
communicative strategy that is employed but the possibility that the government’s asserted
interest and citizens’ interests diverge. Many citizens want to take certain risks even if they cause
heart disease (#1). Others don’t want to save energy by incurring additional costs (#2, #3, #4);
like to drink alcohol and take drugs (#3); and don’t want to save their money (#4). In all these
cases, the government’s effort to communicate the costs and benefits of courses of action can
easily become efforts to cause people to do things they don’t want to do—or to force transfers
from one group of disfavored people to another group of favored people.
Consider, for example, the suggestion that the government should order public utilities to
include a green default, so that people who don’t opt out on their utility bills or contracts spend a
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little more money and save energy. Divide the population into three types: Econs, who choose
the outcome they prefer regardless of the default; Greens who want to save energy but need the
default to prompt them; and Cheapskates who do not want to save energy but will fail to opt out
of the energy-saving default. If the government uses the green default, then it is fair to say, using
the definition I started with, that the Cheapskates are manipulated. 14 If the government does not
use the green default, then the Greens are manipulated. We might find either of these options
objectionable, but unless some other method can be found, manipulation of part of the
population—in the sense of using artifice to cause a transfer that is not desired—is unavoidable.
Accordingly, we should choose the option that maximizes aggregate well-being.
If we think more broadly about how the government behaves in other settings, we can’t
possibly argue that “manipulation” should be off the table because it can “deprive people of
agency,” fail to respect “autonomy,” or “bypass deliberation.” While we do not want the
government to short-circuit public deliberation about policies and the merits of elected officials,
democratic policy-making can certainly endorse regulatory means that do so.
That is why we dot no object to government ceremonies that instill patriotism by
invoking emotionally resonant images and stories. We acquiesce in the good-cop-bad-cop
routine. We acknowledge that financial regulators might be justified in exaggerating their
confidence in the financial system in order to forestall a run on banks. We let judges wear robes
and sit on daises so that they project authority. We understand that enforcement agencies like the
IRS must give the impression that they engage in more audits than they actually do. In a
democracy, we authorize the government to manipulate us—just as we authorize it to use force
against us—as long as it acts in the common good.
Conclusion
The government should feel free to use manipulation as long as the manipulative act
advances aggregate welfare or achieves other publicly endorsed goals, whatever they might be.
The analogous claim about coercion—that the government should use coercion to advance public
goals but only for such purpose—is hardly controversial, and there does not seem to be anything
different about manipulation, as long as the policy of manipulation is made clear and is open to
public debate. 15
I believe that criticisms of libertarian paternalism is partly based on this
misunderstanding that manipulation is worse than, or relevantly different from, coercion. It’s not.
I think that the main source of uneasiness about libertarian paternalism is that it is not actually
libertarian; it is just paternalism.

14

One might argue that the Cheapskates are not manipulated, just adversely affected, at least if the government does
not intended this outcome. But I assume that it does.
15
Manipulation that is concealed from the public is more troublesome, but no one seems to defend this type of
manipulation.

12

To see why, consider a blatantly paternalistic (and coercive) law that forbids financial
institutions to sell complex financial instruments to unsophisticated investors. 16 The law divides
the public into two populations: the sophisticated people who are allowed to buy, and the
unsophisticated people who are not allowed to buy. Now consider an alternative approach that
uses a nudge. The law provides that when people sign up with investment brokerages, they must
check a box on a form that allows them to opt out of a prohibition on buying complex
instruments. Suppose further that the form is designed on the basis of behavioral insights, so that
only sophisticated investors check the box. The upshot is that the nudge produces the same
outcome—the division of the population into sophisticated people who are allowed to buy, and
unsophisticated people who are forbidden to buy—as the coercive law.
It is tempting to argue that the opt-out approach is not coercive and hence not really
paternalistic. After all, the unsophisticated person could opt out if the function of the box were
brought to his attention. The problem with this argument is that the nudge approach is premised
on the assumption that the unsophisticated people can be screened out. If they can’t be, then we
would judge this nudge a failure. To be precise: nudges are effective only to the extent that they
are coercive.
So there is nothing libertarian about nudging. They may not seem as coercive as
mandates and prohibitions but appearances are deceiving. When Sunstein compares a nudge to a
mandate, he compares a nudge that is directed at a small population with a mandate that is
directed at a large population. The different sizes of the populations make the mandate seem
more coercive, but the population size is not inherent to the distinction between a nudge and a
mandate. After all, a mandate like the minimum wage law could be applied to as small or large a
population as one wants.
Whether a nudge is paternalistic depends on whether it is designed to force people to
avoid unwise choices that harm themselves. As Sunstein’s many examples show, a nudge can
also be designed for the less controversial task of correcting negative externalities. “Libertarian
paternalism” is accordingly a confusing name for Sunstein’s research program. Paternalism is
perhaps an element of the research program but does not exhaust it.

16

This example is based roughly on the “suitability doctrine,” which provides that certain broker-dealers must
recommend investments that are appropriate for their customers’ investment needs. The actual law is more complex.
The suitability doctrine is not a legal rule, but a rule that exchanges and other self-regulating organizations impose
on their members. It is also regarded as ethical obligation. But when broker-dealers violate this rule, victims may be
able to sue them under federal securities fraud laws. Courts are more sympathetic to victims when they are
unsophisticated, which has reinforced the norm that broker-dealers may offer more complex products to
sophisticated customers than to unsophisticated customers.

13

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Eric A. Posner
eposner@uchicago.edu

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–600 please go to Working Papers at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.

621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639
640.

David A. Weisbach, Should Environmental Taxes Be Precautionary? June 2012
Saul Levmore, Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent in Commercial and Other
Law, June 2012
David S. Evans, Excessive Litigation by Business Users of Free Platform Services, June 2012
Ariel Porat, Mistake under the Common European Sales Law, June 2012
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contrat Evolution, June 2012
Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, International Paretianism: A Defense, July 2012
Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, July 2012
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law, July 2012
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic
Cooperation, July 2012
M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auction Approach to
Regulatory Assignments, August 2012
Joseph Isenbergh, Cliff Schmiff, August 2012
James Melton and Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?, September
2014
M. Todd Henderson, Voice versus Exit in Health Care Policy, October 2012
Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker”
American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucault’s 1979 Birth of Biopolitics Lectures, October 2012
William H. J. Hubbard, Another Look at the Eurobarometer Surveys, October 2012
Lee Anne Fennell, Resource Access Costs, October 2012
Ariel Porat, Negligence Liability for Non-Negligent Behavior, November 2012
William A. Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch, November 2012
David S. Evans and Elisa V. Mariscal, The Role of Keyword Advertisign in Competition among
Rival Brands, November 2012
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and David S. Evans, Replacing the LIBOR with a Transparent and
Reliable Index of interbank Borrowing: Comments on the Wheatley Review of LIBOR Initial
Discussion Paper, November 2012
Reid Thompson and David Weisbach, Attributes of Ownership, November 2012
Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution, November 2012
David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform
Businesses, December 2012
James Melton, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Kalev Leetaru, On the Interpretability of Law:
Lessons from the Decoding of National Constitutions, December 2012
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Unemployment and Regulatory Policy, December 2012
David S. Evans, Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Platforms, January 2013
David S. Evans, Attention to Rivalry among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust
Analysis, January 2013
Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice: Economic Analysis, January 2013
M. Todd Henderson, Can Lawyers Stay in the Driver’s Seat?, January 2013
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage,
January 2013
Randal C. Picker, Access and the Public Domain, February 2013
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, February 2013
Anup Malani and Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, February 2013
Arial Porat and Lior Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data,
February 2013
Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, February 2013
Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, No Contract? March 2013
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, March 2013
M. Todd Henderson, Self-Regulation for the Mortgage Industry, March 2013
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, April 2013
Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation through Boilerplate: An Apologia, April 2013

641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.

653.
654.

655.

656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.

Anthony J. Casey and Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, May 2013
William H. J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum
Shopping in the New York Courts, May 2013
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying as Efficient Corporate Governance, May
2013
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency
Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, April 2015
Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path
Dependence, and Temporary Law, June 2013
Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Boards, July 2013
Mary Anne Case, Is There a Lingua Franca for the American Legal Academy? July 2013
Bernard Harcourt, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: A Mirror of the History of the
Foundations of Modern Criminal Law, July 2013
Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic
Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, July 2013
Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-economic
Rights as “Insurance Swaps”, August 2013
Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach, and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Audits as Signals, August
2013
Elisabeth J. Moyer, Michael D. Woolley, Michael J. Glotter, and David A. Weisbach, Climate
Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers of Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon, August
2013
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate
Reorganization, September 2013
Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, “Becker and Foucault on Crime and
Punishment”—A Conversation with Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt: The
Second Session, September 2013
Edward R. Morrison, Arpit Gupta, Lenora M. Olson, Lawrence J. Cook, and Heather Keenan,
Health and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Automobile Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy,
October 2013
Evidentiary Privileges in International Arbitration, Richard M. Mosk and Tom Ginsburg, October
2013
Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl,
October 2013
The Impact of the U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event
Study Analysis, David S. Evans, Howard Chang, and Steven Joyce, October 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Just Enough, October 2013
Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, April 2014
Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, Crystal S. Yang,
October 2013
Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence
from Booker, Crystal S. Yang, March 2014
William H. J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, March 2015
Tom Ginsburg, Nick Foti, and Daniel Rockmore, “We the Peoples”: The Global Origins of
Constitutional Preambles, April 2014
Lee Anne Fennell and Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, December 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, December 2013
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, A Winner’s Curse?: Promotions from the Lower
Federal Courts, December 2013
Jose Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism and
Parliamentarism, December 2013
Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and Evidentiary Basis of
Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy, November 2013
Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity versus Noninfringement, December 2013
M. Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test of
Congressional Control over Judicial Behavior, January 2014
Lisa Bernstein, Copying and Context: Tying as a Solution to the Lack of Intellectual Property
Protection of Contract Terms, January 2014

673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
678.
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.

Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Voting Rules in International Organizations, January 2014
Tom Ginsburg and Thomas J. Miles, The Teaching/Research Tradeoff in Law: Data from the
Right Tail, February 2014
Ariel Porat and Eric Posner, Offsetting Benefits, February 2014
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Roles in Nonjudicial Functions, February 2014
Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices at the Border:
An Empirical Study, February 2014
David S. Evans, Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, and Xinzhu Zhang, Assessing Unfair Pricing under
China's Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries, March 2014
Jonathan S. Masur and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, March 2014
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial
Disclosure Regulation, March 2014
Yun-chien Chang and Lee Anne Fennell, Partition and Revelation, April 2014
Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All?
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, May 2014
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to
Criticisms, May 2014
Adam B. Badawi and Anthony J. Casey, The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts Through the Corporate
Lens, March 2014
David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized Public-Ledger Currency
Platforms, April 2014
Preston M. Torbert, A Study of the Risks of Contract Ambiguity, May 2014
Adam S. Chilton, The Laws of War and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, May 2014
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, April 2015
David Weisbach, Distributionally-Weighted Cost Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets
Organizational Design, June 2014
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents,
June 2014
William H. J. Hubbard, Nuisance Suits, June 2014
Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Credible Threats, July 2014
Douglas G. Baird, One-and-a-Half Badges of Fraud, August 2014
Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference? August 2014
Maria Bigoni, Stefania Bortolotti, Francesco Parisi, and Ariel Porat, Unbundling Efficient Breach,
August 2014
Adam S. Chilton and Eric A. Posner, An Empirical Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship,
August 2014
David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy, August 2014
Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital Adequacy Requirements? September
2014
Saul Levmore, Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, August 2014
Adam S. Chilton, Reconsidering the Motivations of the United States? Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program, July 2014
Dhammika Dharmapala and Vikramaditya S. Khanna, The Costs and Benefits of Mandatory
Securities Regulation: Evidence from Market Reactions to the JOBS Act of 2012, August 2014
Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review
of the Empirical Literature, September 2014
Dhammika Dharmapala, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Simple Conceptual Framework,
September 2014
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction,
October 2014
Thomas J. Miles and Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence
from 'Secure Communities', October 2014
Ariel Porat and Omri Yadlin, A Welfarist Perspective on Lies, May 2015
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being and Public Policy,
November 2014
David S. Evans, The Antitrust Analysis of Rules and Standards for Software Platforms, November
2014
E. Glen Weyl and Alexander White, Let the Best 'One' Win: Policy Lessons from the New
Economics of Platforms, December 2014

710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.
725.
726.

Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, December 2014
Anthony J. Casey and Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, December 2014
Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg, The Inefficacy of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions,
December 2014
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics,
January 2015
Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance,
May 2015
Adam M. Samaha and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Don't Ask, Must Tell—and Other Combinations,
January 2015
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigovian State, February 2015
Lee Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity, February 2015
Steven Douglas Smith, Michael B. Rappaport, William Baude, and Stephen E. Sachs, The New
and Old Originalism: A Discussion, February 2015
Adam S. Chilton and Eric A. Posner, The Influence of History on States’ Compliance with Human
Rights Obligations, March 2015
Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, No-Haggle Agreements, March 2015
Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, Rethinking Threats, March 2015
Adam Chilton, The Politics of the United States’ Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, March
2015
David S. Evans and Alexis Pirchio, An Empirical Examination of Why Mobile Money Schemes
Ignite in Some Developing Countries but Flounder in Most, March 2015
Anthony J. Casey and Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, February 2015
Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala, Interest Deductions in a Multijurisdictional World,
April 2015
Eric A. Posner, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Manipulation, June 2015

